学术讲座预告：
1.Sponsored Tasks and Solver Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests
2.如何发表高水平论文兼论如何选取高质量研究课题
根据“郑州大学管理学院学科发展战略咨询委员会一届二次会议”系列学术报告工作安排，特邀美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Naveen Jindal管理学院陈建清（Jianqing Chen）教授做学术报告，欢迎广大师生踊跃参加！
报告人：陈建清教授（University of Texas at Dallas）
主持人：翟运开教授（郑州大学管理学院副院长）
活动1：学术报告
题 目：Sponsored Tasks and Solver Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests
时 间：2023年8月8日（周二）上午9:30~11:30
地 点：管理学院1号楼109会议室
面向人员：本院师生
活动2：座谈会
主 题：如何发表高水平论文兼论如何选取高质量研究课题
时 间：2023年8月8日（周二）下午15:00~17:00
地 点：管理学院1号楼319会议室
面向人员：感兴趣的老师与研究生
报告人简介：
陈建清教授,美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校（简称UTD）Naveen Jindal管理学院Ashbel Smith教授。主要从事平台商业模式、在线广告及定价、网络拍卖机制设计、在线社区和用户创造内容、信息系统经济学等领域的研究。在Information Systems Research, MIS Quarterly, Management Science, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Production and Operations Management, and Journal of Management Information Systems等国际顶级期刊（UTD 24）发表近三十篇论文。目前担任Information Systems Research副编辑, Production and Operations Management资深编辑。
报告1摘要：
Crowdsourcing platforms provide venues for firms looking for solutions (seekers) to interact with individuals who can provide solutions (solvers). As crowdsourcing contest platforms have grown in popularity with numerous tasks being posted on a daily basis, a concern that has emerged is that many similar tasks compete for solver attention, with some tasks failing to attract sufficient solver participation. To alleviate such a concern, in addition to regular task listings, many crowdsourcing platforms offer sponsorship programs under which seekers pay an extra fee for highlighting their tasks to draw solvers’ attention. We examine the effect of sponsorship on solver participation using a unique data set collected from a leading crowdsourcing platform. In contrast to platforms’ claims about the effect of sponsorship on participation, we find that sponsorship does not always boost participation in crowdsourcing contests; sponsorship increases the number of participants only when the prize amount for a task is already high. Furthermore, even when the number of participants increases, the increase primarily comes from low-ability solvers. We also find that when sponsorship increases the total number of submissions, it does so only through increasing the number of participants; sponsorship does not increase the number of submissions individual solvers submit after joining a task. A more granular analysis reveals an effect of anticipated increased competition caused by sponsorship on high-ability solvers but not on those of low ability, explaining the difference in their participation decisions when facing sponsored tasks. We also find the effect of sponsorship weakens over the duration of a task for high-ability solvers and is also weaker for solvers with more experience on the platform.
郑州大学管理学院
2023年8月4日
